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Despite the reform of 1997, numerous negative elements remained in 
the pension system which operate towards a levelling of the future 
pensioner society, regardless of the earlier position and time spent on 
the labour market or of the earnings. As a result the system in part 
reproduces poverty among the elderly. Due to problems with the second 
pillar of the pension system, further changes were made recently to the 
system. However, the move towards private insurance predicted by 
experts has been less than expected because employees do not have 
confidence in the social insurance pension system.  
Society must face the problem that within the stratum of pensioners 
who make up close to one third of the total population, substantial 
numbers of pensioners have incomes close to the subsistence minimum. 
In order to ease this trend 1) there is a need to introduce regulators on 
the labour market imposing stricter sanctions on the evasion of social 
insurance by both employees and employers (e.g. through unregistered 
work), thereby increasing social security in old age for employees. 2) 
Pensions should be indexed not to a combination of wage increases and 
inflation, but solely to wage increases since at present these exceed 
inflation.  3
 
Biological and social background of the problems of the pension 
system  
 
Demographical ageing  
 
Hungarian society is a rapidly ageing society in both the demographical 
and the social senses. In 1980 persons over 60 years represented 
17.1% of the population, 10 years later this figure was 18.9% and by 
2000 it had risen to 19.7%. Similar demographical ageing characterised 
the 65 years and over age group. In 1990 persons 65 years and over 
represented 13.4% of the population and those 85 years and over 
represented 2.6% (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993). By 2000   
persons 65 years and over already represented 14.6% [Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office (HCSO) 2001, p. 44.] (Table 1). The trend is 
also found for persons over 70 years (HCSO, 2000, Statistical Pocket-
book of Hungary ‘99, p. 14, Budapest).  
 
Table 1. Distribution of the population by main age group in 2000  
 0-14  15-44 45-64 65+  Total 
HUN  17.1 42.7 25.5 14.6  100.0 
Source:   Demographical Yearbook 2000 [HCSO 2001, p. 44]  
 
The total population (10,044,000 persons; HCSO, 2000, 14) 
increase fell to –3.8 per 1000 in 2000 (Table 2), a drastic decline 
compared to the 1970 rate of +3.1, and even the 1990 rate of –1.9 
(HCSO, 2000, 20) (EUROSTAT 2000, p. 2. table 2). This process in itself 





Table 2. Population change in 2000 (first estimates), per 1000 
population 
 Live  births Deaths  Natural 
increase 
Net migration Total increase
HUN 9.6  13.3  -3.8 0.0  -3.8  
EU-15  10.8 9.8 0.9 2.2 3.1 




The biological ageing is further aggravated by social ageing. By this 
expression Hungarian society, social and economic policy-makers, 
decision-makers, experts dealing with elderly people and civil society 
mean the proportion of pensioners and persons of pensionable age. 
While in 1990 the proportion of pensioners within society was only 24.3%, 
in the short space of ten years (by 2000) this figure rose to 31.2%. The 
changed social and economic circumstances are to be found behind this 
increase. During these 10 years early withdrawal from the labour market 
through various channels was one of the most widely used ways of 
avoiding unemployment. These channels have been: retirement on 
disability pension before reaching retirement age (Széman 1990). Pre-
retirement was introduced in 1990 and in this form employers transferred 
the benefit for employees no more than five years younger than 
retirement age to social insurance body until their employees reached 
the normal retirement age. Anticipatory retirement was introduced a year 
later, in 1991 as part of the unemployment system and it was paid to 
registered unemployed whose eligibility for unemployment benefit had 
expired and they had no job offer (it was eliminated in 1997). Since 1997  5
as part of the new pension reform the so called advanced pension for 
certain cohorts, a type of early withdrawal was introduced. 
In addition, traditional forms of “ normal early withdrawal” (persons 
working in jobs detrimental to the health cold go into retirement earlier 
before reaching retirement age) increased variety and possibility of 
withdrawal from the labour market earlier. 
 
1.Traditional forms of early withdrawal (existing also before the systemic 
change, before 1990) 
a) Disability pension before early retirement 
b) Pension for persons working in jobs detrimental to the health 
 
2.New forms of early withdrawal (after 1990) 
a) Pre-retirement (1990) 
b) Anticipatory retirement (1991-1997) 
c) Advanced retirement for certain cohorts (after the pension reform in 
1997) 
d) Advanced retirement on reduced pension 
e) Partial old age pension with lower service period for certain cohorts 
 
  As a result of the  rapid early withdrawal not only people reaching 
retirement age got a pension or pension type-benefit. In January 2001 a 
total of 3,116,000 persons received some form of social insurance 
pension or pension-type benefit. Of these, two thirds received old-age 
pensions in their own right or old-age-type pensions (e.g. persons on  6
disability pension who have reached retirement age, persons on 
advanced and early retirement).  
Because of the above trend the social ageing is more serious than 
biological ageing not only because of its greater proportions but also 
because of the many attendant problems such as effect on the labour 
market and the negative budgetary impacts.  E.g. the dependency rate is 
very high compared to other countries. In 1995, for example, for every 
100 economically active persons there was 124 dependants, compared 
to only 104 in Sweden, 107 in Germany and 108 in the United Kingdom 
(KSH, 1997, 246) (See also Simonovits 2002).  
Because of cuts in the social protection system (e.g. there is no 
longer any real welfare protection after the expiry of the 6 months of 
unemployment benefit) (Lévai-Széman 1993) people wanted to withdraw 
from the labour market earlier, in part because of deteriorated health and 
in part because the pension, by insuring a small, steady income, 
provides a kind of social protection against unemployment. As a result, 
there has been an increase in expenditure on social insurance, social 
and welfare services which have reached 20.7% of GDP. Large sums 
were spent from the steadily declining GDP
1 on benefits for the aged.
2 
From 9.1% in 1989, expenditure on pensions reached 11% in 1991 and 
the level was only slightly lower in 1994. In addition, because of pre-
retirement the outstanding assets of the Pension Fund increased 6.7-fold, 
from 890 million to 6 billion HUF (9.1 million and 63 million USD) 
between 1992 and 1995.
3 There was a lack of a flat-rate pension as well.  
                                      
1 In 1990 the GDP index was -3.5 %, in 1991 -11.9 %, in 1992 -4.5 % (Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv 
‘93, 1994: 196). 
2  In 1991 pensioners received annual compensation of 24 % linked to net average earnings (the 
inflation rate was 24%). In 1995, the increase was only 11 %, while the average inflation rate was 
28,8%. 
3Bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against 5.3 % of firms in industry (788 out of 14,796), against 
3.4 % in the construction industry (298 out of 8687) and 10 % of those in agriculture (373 out of 3750). 
(Monthly Statistical Reports 1992/12, KSH: 87).  7
Subsequently the share of welfare expenditures in GDP declined 
(Table 3) despite the fact that pensions were increased continuously 
from the early 1990s. At the same time, various penalty points have been 
incorporated into the calculation of pensions which means that persons 
newly retiring are awarded lower pensions than persons who had retired 
earlier. 
Since the economically active population has continued to decline, 
while the proportion of pensioners has been rising a new, uniform, higher 
retirement age was introduced as part of the pension reform in 1997. The 
retirement age was raised to 62 years from the earlier 60 years for men 
and 55 years for women. 
             
Table 3 
Changes of real values of welfare expenditures in % of GDP, 1991-
1999            (1991  =  100) 
  1991 1999 1991 1999 
  
Education  5,6 4,4 100  87 
Health  5,5 4,3 100  85 
Social insurance, social and welfare services 20,7  14,9  100  79 
Housing, settlements and regions  4,0  1,1  100  31 
Spare time, culture  1,7  1,2  100  77 
Environment  protection  0,7 1,0 100  159 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
 
Regulatory measures and other factors influencing the situation of 
future pensioners 
 
One of the penalty elements introduced into the pension system was the 
introduction of an upper limit on individual pension contributions from 
                                                                                                                      
  8
1992. Earlier, between 1988 and 1992 there had been no ceiling on 
pension contributions and hence on the income that could be taken into 
account in calculating the old-age pension. However, from 1992 the 
upper limit of pension contributions was set each year. In this way, 
someone with high earnings between 1988 and 1992 could increase 
their future pension substantially, in contrast with the situation following 
1992. In 2001 and 2002 the ceilings were still relatively low (Table 4).  At 
the time of writing it has not yet been decided whether this limit will be 
raised in 2003. 
 
Table 4. Upper limit of income taken into account in calculating 
contributions and pensions 
 
Year  Upper limit of 
income taken into 
account (HUF) 
Upper limit of 





basis year (based 
on annual income)
2001  2 197 300  9554  183 108  Basis year =100%
2002  2 368 850   10 378  197 404  107.8% 
2003  3 905 500  16 980  325 458  177.7% 
Increase in 2002–
2003 
    
2002 = Basis year        100% 
2003     164.9  % 
 
Calculation of the amount of pension awarded is determined by the 
much discussed Pension Act based on three pillars
4 which  came  into 
                                      
 
 
4. The first pillar is still the compulsory pension fund operating on the same principle as before the 
reform. The social insurance pension continues to operate in the “pay as you go” system.  
The second pillar is the private pension funds operating on the funded principle (also known as 
compulsory private pension funds). Citizens pay a certain per cent of their income (up to a ceiling of 
double the average earnings) into one of these funds which invests the savings to increase the sum 
that will be the basis for the future benefit. On retirement the pensioner then receives the resulting sum 
in the form of an annuity or (exceptionally) as a lump sum.  
The third pillar is the voluntary mutual benefit funds, as well as commercial insurance policies and 
other forms of saving.  9
effect in 1997 (see, e.g. the paper presented at the workshop by A. 
Simonyi). In this paper I concentrate primarily on the present situation; I 
shall not analyse the changes planned for after 2008 (e.g. taking into 
account the gross average earnings, calculation of the service period in 
the light of whether the person paid pension contributions solely to the 
social insurance system or also paid contributions to a private insurance 
fund). The amount of the old-age pension depends on the years of 
service recognised and the monthly average earnings. (The pension is 
tax exempt, consequently at present the calculation is based on net 
income.) The present pension system contains both positive and 
negative features: 
The method used to calculate pensions is very complicated. The 
range of persons entitled to pensions is also very wide. a) Persons who 
have reached the age of 62 years and have at least 20 years of service 
are entitled to the full social insurance old-age pension. b ) Persons three 
years younger than 62 years and with at least 40 years of service are 
entitled to an advanced pension. c) Insurees who have reached the age 
of 59 years and who have no more than 3 years less than the 40 years of 
service may be awarded a reduced advanced pension. d) Partial old-age 
pensions may be awarded to persons with less than 20 years of service
5 
                                                                                                                      
Up to the end of August 1999 the reform also gave employees who were not beginners the opportunity 
to join a private pension fund. At least half of those in employment took advantage of this possibility. 
Those who opted for the mixed pension system renounced one quarter of their future social insurance 
pension in the hope that their contributions to their own account in a private pension fund, through 
investment, would eventually amount to more than this. In 2002 people were given the possibility up to 
the end of the year to leave the private pension fund and return to the purely social insurance system. 
The justification for this measure was that the conditions serving earlier as a basis for the calculations 
had changed over 5 years. Originally, the compulsory contribution to be paid to private pension funds 
would have been 8% for the last 3 years. However, the government in power in 1998–2002 reduced 
this by one quarter to 6%. The state guarantee that the part of the pension derived from private 
pension funds would not be less than 25% of the total pension was withdrawn. The new Socialist-Free 
Democrat government is increasing this contribution by 1% in 2003 and in 2004 it will reach the level 
originally planned. The private pension funds are in decline and this can have a negative influence on 
active workers on the labour market, the pensioners of the future. This situation is also reflected in 
individual household savings. (Szeman, Zs (2001). 
5 A) Men or women who reach (have reached) the age limit applying to them between June 30 1993 
and January 1 2009 and have obtained at least 15 years of service up to that point.   10
(Article 7 of the Pension Act ), and e) there are special rules applying to 
persons who have worked in jobs imposing exceptional physical strain 
and detrimental to the health. f) Separate regulations apply to disability 
pensions. 
  The longer the period spent on the labour market the higher the 
pension. After 20 years the pension is 53% of the average earnings and 
after 40 years 80%. The Pension Act rewards those who remain active 
after reaching retirement age and those with a longer period of labour 
market activity. Each year above 40 years of service means a 1.5% 
increase in the average earnings. (Table 5) 
 
Table 5 The amount of pension as a function of the period of 
service  
Period of service  Percentage of monthly average 
earnings 




Each subsequent year: 1.5% 
 
Potential poverty traps in the pension system  
 
The period of service increases the pension while the degression in the 
calculation of income decreases the pension awarded. This has an 
unfavourable influence in the case of persons with higher active earnings 
during their active years and leads to a decline in the standard of living 
and a degree of impoverishment in old age. For those with higher 
incomes this degression restricts the amount calculated from a relatively  11
low average earnings.  The regulator in force in 2002, for example, 
applied a very high degressive key to average earnings above 80,000 
HUF (approx. 343 USD) (Table 6). 
 
 
Situation of pensioners 
 
As a result of the increases in the pensions of more than 3 million 
pensioners, the average real value of pensions increased somewhat. 
Nevertheless, in January 2001 the value of the average pension 
compared to average annual earnings was only 59.1% (HCSO, 2002. 
92). 
Comparing pensions and pension-type benefits to the subsistence 
minimum, we find that the two values are very close to each other. The 
average pension is around 10% higher than the subsistence minimum 
calculated by the Central Statistical Office.  In January 2001 close to one 
third of all benefits were between 30,000–40,000 HUF (130 USD – 174 
USD), while the average pension was 35,931 HUF (157 USD) (HSCO, 
2000, 81.). This means that a substantial proportion of pensioners 
received sums below or very close to the subsistence minimum. 
Pensioners living alone were in an especially bad situation.  According to 
the subjective opinion of pensioner households the “official” subsistence 
minimum is sufficient only for a very limited livelihood and in reality they 
need a larger sum (Kardos-Szabó-Szeman-Talyigás, 2003.). Moreover 
women, who made up a majority of pensioners, were in a much worse 
situation than the men. In early 2001 there was a difference of more than 
6600 HUF (29 USD) between the pensions of men and women, to the 
detriment of the latter. This is due to the shorter period of service  12
accumulated by women and to the lower level of women’s earnings (an 
average of 20–30% lower than those of men). Why did a relatively large 
stratum of poor persons arise among pensioners and how is it 
reproduced?  
One of the explanations for the reproduction is to be sought in the 
regulatory system itself. While the advanced old-age pension allows 
members of the labour market to retire relatively young, three years 
before the normal retirement age of 62, this also requires a very long 
period of service, at least 40 years which cannot be accumulated if a 
person has been unemployed for even a short while or has dropped out 
of the labour market for some other reason.  
The Pension Act is more lenient in the case of reduced advanced 
old-age pensions allowing people to retire earlier with a shorter period of 
service but in this case they receive a lower pension.  
Also in a worse situation are men and women entitled to a partial 
old-age pension who have less than 20 years of service, and disability 
pensioners whose pension in all cases is much lower than the old-age 
pension. 
With low average earnings, even with a relatively long service 
period, poverty in old-age can be reproduced. A person with a relatively 
long service period of 35 years and an average wage of 54,600 HUF 
(243 USD) will receive a pension of 39,858 HUF (177 USD) (according to 
a calculation by a social insurance expert). This sum will be below the 
average pension and as a result the pensioner falls into the poverty trap 
despite the fact that he or she worked for 35 years and the Pension Act 
recognises this as a long period.  
Another problem of pensioners is that differences between the 
earnings in the active period are blurred in the benefits paid by social  13
insurance: differences often as high as 10–15-fold in incomes in the 
active period are reduced to 3–4-fold in retirement. 
What is the situation if someone has worked for a long period (e.g. 
44 years) and always earned more than the given pension ceiling? If 
someone earned five times the average wage (approx. 110,000 HUF/489 
USD) in the period 1988–1992 and applied for retirement in 2002, he or 
she could count on a pension of 110,000 HUF. This would have meant 
that his or her income, which has been 330,000 HUF (1467 USD) would 
suddenly fall to one third. The use of degressive calculation and a ceiling 
can be regarded as a form of penalty.  
The result of all this is that persons withdrawing from the labour 
market experience a deterioration in their standard of living which can 
lead in the long term to poverty, even if they were earlier in a good 
position with a high income and had a long period of service. Most active 
earners are unable to accumulate savings from their earnings because of 
the high cost of living, providing an education for their children, helping 
them at the start of their career and obtaining housing for them.  
The poor have even less possibility for savings. A survey on 
poverty found that more than one third of households in the sample had 
no savings but if the compulsory social insurance was not taken into 
account the proportion of households without savings was twice as high: 
66% of all households had no savings (Ferge-Tausz-Dávid, 2002, 45).  
This means that for the most part pensioners live on their pensions, 
which are low. In January 2002 only 0.3% of all pensioners received a 
pension higher than 100,000 HUF (430 USD), which can be regarded as 
a high benefit. Less than 2% had a pension of over 80,000 HUF (348 
USD). One fifth had pensions of 25,000–30,000 (130 USD) and around 
40% had pensions of 30,000–40,000 (131–174 USD), when the average 
pension was 47,500 HUF (206 USD). In other words, the majority of  14
pensioners continued to receive sums below the average pension which, 
as already noted, was around the subsistence minimum or sufficient for 
only a very modest livelihood (Kardos-Szabó-Széman-Talyigás, 2003).  
It is a further indication of the poor situation of pensioners that 
more than 800,000 pensioners applied for pension increase on the 
grounds of neediness when this possibility was introduced as a measure 
to raise the level of the lowest pensions. This figure represents more 
than one quarter of all pensioners. 
In principle the Pension Act ensures the possibility for people to live 
without care in retirement. Why are Hungarian pensioners poor despite 
this and why is this trend continuing? The trend will depend to a great 
extent on changes made in the regulators. Besides the award of pension 
increases in cases of neediness, the plan to raise the pension ceiling will 
also act against impoverishment.  
Poverty among pensioners has not arisen because people were 
not willing to work. Part of the poverty has always been related to certain 
elements in the pension system and their amendment over time, to 
connections between the pension system and the labour market, and to 
the system of regulators applied to the labour market, e.g. the failure to 
adjust past earnings for inflation when calculating the pension, the 
restrictions imposed, the period of service taken into account, etc. In 
principle, it is possible to achieve a pension equivalent to 100% of the 
previous earnings. However the Act does not allow a pensioner to 
receive a benefit higher than the earlier average adjusted income. 
Moreover, such a case (100% pension) would have been possible only if 
the person had earned around the minimum wage.  
There is also another important element in poverty: the nature of 
the connection to the labour market.  
  15
The prospects in retirement of persons who are poor while still 
active 
 
What happens to persons in an economic and social position that allows 
them to join the labour market for only a very short period? 
  In 2001 as part of an ILO (International Labour Organisation) 
project, research was carried out on “Struggle against poverty and social 
exclusion”, examining households in the poorest third of the population. 
The households were selected by multi-step, random sampling. 73% of 
the household heads were men and 27% women. The selected 
interviewees were aged between 18–60 years and a few of them were 
pensioners (mainly disability pensioners) (Ferge, Zs. Tausz, K. Darvas, Á. 
2002, 19).  
  Part of the survey of importance to our subject will be analysed in 
the following (with the permission of the authors).  As we have seen, one 
of the key elements in calculating pensions is the period of time spent on 
the labour market. In reply to the question “How many years in insured 
employment giving pension entitlement have you accumulated?” 19% of 
the household heads gave the answer 1-9 years and 40% 10-20 years.  
  In this same poverty sample representative of the lower third of the 
population, 72% of all household heads aged 55–60 years were disability 
pensioners. Close to one third of the disability pensioners had no more 
than 20 years covered by insurance and 5% had less than 10 years. A 
further one quarter had 10–20 years of service. This low period of 
service can be explained by early withdrawal (Tables 7a, 7b). As a result 
these people received pensions much lower than the old-age pension. 
Disability pensions can be granted to persons a) who have lost 67% of 
their capacity for work due to deterioration of their health and no 
improvement is expected in this state for one year, b) have obtained the  16
necessary service period, c) are not working regularly or are earning 
substantially less than before the disability. The Pension Act sets out the 
period of service required for the different age groups in the case of 
disability, rising steadily from 1 year at the age of 22 years (to 15 years 
at 45–54 years). From the age of 55 years a person must have 20 years 
of service to be awarded a disability pension. This means that being a 
disability pensioner inevitably results in a state close to poverty in old 
age. It has already been observed that the average pension is very close 
to the subsistence minimum. However, a distinction must be made 
between the average pensions for different categories of pensioners. 
The highest average pension is that of persons receiving full old-age 
pensions. The average monthly benefit of disability pensioners below 
retirement age is around 20% lower. It can be seen that right from the 
outset the disability pensioner is much closer to the poverty trap than a 
person who withdrew from the labour market through the “normal” 
channel even if with penalty points. Nevertheless, the fact of being on a 
disability pension does offer a certain degree of protection with the low 
but regular income that it gives, compared to the insecurity of 
unemployment. In the poverty sample 17% of the household heads were 
unemployed and in the case of those over 46 years this proportion was 
still a high 15%. Close to one fifth of the men but only 11% of the women 
were unemployed (Ferge-Tausz-Dávid, 2002, 74). Under the provisions 
of the Pension Act, from December 31, 2008 the sums paid in the form of 
unemployment benefits, unemployment aid before retirement (as well as 
child-raising support and nursing fee), and other income derived from 
insurance during the period covered by these benefits will not be taken 
into account in calculating the average monthly earnings forming the 
basis of the old-age pension, unless this sum is more favourable for the 
applicant. (In the latter case the combined sum of income derived from  17
insurance and the benefits listed must be taken into account as 
earnings.)  
In 2002 a person over the age of 46 years had a high chance of 
becoming unemployed before reaching retirement age since, as 
confirmed by another survey, society, and especially firms, regard those 
who have reached 40 or 45 years as “elderly” members of the labour 
market, or at least on the way towards ageing. (Others regard manpower 
as elderly “only” at a later age, after reaching 50 or 55 years) (Széman, 
2002).  
It is striking that the proportion of disabled persons is also high in 
the under 30 years age group. 18% of those in this age group were 
disabled. Most of these people had accumulated only a very short 
service period. The great majority (79%) had less than 10 years of 
employment. This is important because in principle the elder age groups 
have a whole life career in which to avoid the poverty trap – although it 
must be stressed that this is only in principle – while people leaving the 
labour market before the age of 30 have already fallen into that trap. At 
the same time, these younger people whose health has deteriorated 
almost certainly took advantage of the possibility of retirement on a 
disability pension, particularly since there was a great risk of 
unemployment for people under the age of 30 too. In the survey on 
poverty 23% of those in the sample aged 18–29 years were unemployed 
(Ferge-Tausz-Dávid, 2002, 99).  
 
Table 6.a Percentage of disability pensioners and service period 
accumulated, by age group  18
 
Table 6.b Breakdown of the economically active by age group and 
period of service accumulated  
 
 
For the above reasons, withdrawal on a disability pension is a 
widely used form for leaving the labour market. In January 2000 disability 
pensioners below retirement age represented 13% of all pensioners, 
while disability pensioners who had reached retirement age made up 
10.9% (HSCO, 2000, 81). The representative survey with a sample of 
1000 persons over 18 years carried out in 2001 on behalf of the 
Economic Department of the Hitoshubashi University showed the 
following. The lowest activity rates were found in the 51–60 years age 
group where only 36% were active, but one third were disability 
pensioners and close to one quarter old-age pensioners (Széman-
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It is quite obvious that disability pensioners are at a disadvantage 
from the outset. But what are the prospects for those in the sample who 
have not yet reached retirement age, especially elder workers? Table 7b 
shows that one third of the economically active in the 56–60 years age 
group have very few years of service. Assuming that they will all leave 
the labour market at the age of 62 years, a) more than one tenth still 
need 2–7 years to reach the retirement age of 62 years (the age when 
they become entitled to a full old-age pension), b) one quarter have a low 
service record even if we assume that they will spend the next 7 years 
continuously on the labour market. However, since they represent the 
lower third of the population, even if they remain on the labour market 
they have little chance of achieving a higher pension. In the case of 
those with low earnings this is due to the earnings which will be reflected 
in the eventual pension.  
As already noted, withdrawal before the normal retirement age on 
advanced pension or advanced reduced pension must be regarded as 
an element reproducing poverty, channelling the future pensioner 
towards the poverty trap.  
In the case of those with higher earnings, the failure to adjust 
earnings in the last three years before retirement for inflation when 
calculating the pension, reduces the sum of the pension awarded. 
  There is another factor that must be taken into consideration when 
discussing the reproduction of poverty among future pensioners. This is 
activity on the black market, in which case the person does paid work but 
does not accumulate years of insurance. At the workshop in February 
2002 I already indicated this trend characterising the Hungarian 
economy. (In a survey conducted in a sample of 1000 persons, we asked 
whether they regard the statements listed below as true or false.)  20
Because the trend is important for our subject, it is worth considering the 
statements and answers. 
 
Table 7 Statements concerning discrimination 
Statement          Considered  true   
         N    % 
1.They prefer(red) to hire young people.     592    54.8 
2.They only hire(d) people with the right experience.    590      51.9 
3.They do (did) not hire ageing manpower.        590      45.8 
4.They hire(d) people that they can pay less.      588      44.9 
5.They hire(d) young people for creative work and 
older people for work requiring experience.        590      37.0 
6.Young workers are better appreciated than older ones.    585      27.9 
7.The firm requires workers to give invoices.      587      27.7 
8.They  prefer  to  hire  women.       589    26.8 
9.The  firm  willingly  hires  pensioners.     586    21.6 
10.There was strong ethnic discrimination in hiring.      586      13.6 
11.The firm hires people it pays unofficially.        586        9.3 
 
  The fact that close to one tenth of interviewees admitted that firms 
hire people they pay unofficially means that the presence of black labour 
in the economy can be estimated as being at least double the amount 
admitted.  
Depth interviews conducted since then with directors of 
construction firms (Széman 2002, 2003) have confirmed that the firms 
use various illegal or semi-legal techniques: a) they pay employees 
unofficially, meaning that neither the firm nor the employee pays a social 
insurance contribution, b) the firm officially employs persons for the 
minimum wage or close to that level, paying other remuneration 
informally in cash or in kind, c) the firm only employs the worker if he 
gives an invoice (as a self-employed person or small business). In such 
cases the onus of reporting to social insurance and paying the 
contribution falls on the person giving the invoice, not on the firm.  21
This means that employers may employ ageing workers legally, 
semi-legally or illegally. The individual, from his own point of view is 
active in the sense that he is present in the labour market, is part of the 
GDP and in this way is also linked to the macro economy. At the same 
time he does not appear in the statistics, or only in hidden form, or does 
not appear at all in the social insurance systems. In the case listed under 
a) he falls into a black hole as regards social insurance. In the case of c) 
he himself determines the extent of his connection to social insurance 
which in general means that he opts for the smallest cost over the short 
term (the smallest social insurance coverage). This problem is indicated 
in the answers given to a question in the survey concerning problems 
related to entrepreneurial activity. Among the various possible answers, 
the most frequently selected was wage-related expenditures (social 
insurance contribution, unemployment contribution), followed by irregular 
revenues.  
 
Causes of unsuccessful connection to the labour market 
 
Problems of entrepreneurial activity could be selected from seven given 
statements. These were the following. 
 
Statement      % of interviewees selecting 
1.  wages  and  wage-related  costs     64.1 
 (social insurance, unemployment contribution) 
2.  irregular  revenues       62.7 
3.  uncertain  sales       54.2 
4.  low  revenues        54.9 
5.  little  or  no  demand       38.6 
6. difficulty in procuring raw materials      14.4  22
7.  lack  of  suitable  manpower.     13.0 
 
Statements 1 and 2 were selected most frequently. Almost two-thirds of 
the businessmen interviewed indicated problems with wages and wage-
related costs, and irregular revenues as problems. Statement 1 clearly 
indicates what a heavy burden the tax system imposes on businesses, 
while statement 2 once again confirms the financial insecurity 
characterising small businesses.  
  Another fact indicating the problem of lack of a social net is 
revealed in the survey on poverty where the majority of interviewees 
considered that they will receive a pension, despite the fact that only 
around 50% pay a pension contribution or were aware that the employer 
was paying a pension contribution for them. Close to 40% of self-
employed persons and 20% of the unemployed had no insurance 




Despite the reform of 1997, numerous negative elements remained in 
the pension system which operate towards a levelling of the future 
pensioner society, regardless of the earlier position and time spent on 
the labour market or of the earnings. As a result the system in part 
reproduces poverty among the elderly. Therefore, the move from private 
insurance predicted by experts has been less than expected because 
employees do not have confidence in the social insurance pension 
system.  
Society must face the problem that within the stratum of pensioners 
who make up close to one third of the total population, substantial 
numbers of pensioners have incomes close to the subsistence minimum.  23
In order to ease this trend 1) there is a need to introduce regulators on 
the labour market imposing stricter sanctions on the evasion of social 
insurance by both employees and employers (e.g. through unregistered 
work), thereby increasing social security in old age for employees. 2) 
Pensions should be indexed not to a combination of wage increases and 
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